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NOTES
Where Offenders Pay For Their Crimes: Victim
Restitution and Its Constitutionality
In 1982 Congress enacted the Victim and Witness Protection
Act ("VWPA" or "the Act").' Certain sections of the Act provided
that convicted offenders pay restitution to their victims. 2 In United
States v. Weden 3 however, the United States District Court for the
Northern District of Alabama held that these provisions were
unconstitutional.
The VWPA represents a congressional effort "to enhance and
protect the necessary role of crime victims and witnesses in the [fed-
eral] criminal justice process."'4 It does this by: requiring that "vic-
tim impact statements" accompany presentence reports;
5
strengthening the protections afforded victims and witnesses of fed-
eral crimes; 6 ordering the United States Attorney General to promul-
gate guidelines for the Department of Justice concerning the
assistance and protection of witnesses and victims; 7 ordering the
United States Attorney General to outline legislation aimed at de-
priving federal felons of profit from the sale of "their story";8 and,
directing federal courts to order federal offenders to pay restitution to
their victims or to state on the record why such an order was not
issued.9
In United S a/es v. Weden, the district court held the restitution
provisions of the Act unconstitutional as violations of the convicted
person's seventh amendment right to a jury trial of the restitution
issue. 10 Further, the court held the Act violative of the due process
and equal protection clauses of the fifth and fourteenth
1 Victim and Witness Protection Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-291, 51 U.S.L.W. 139
[hereinafter cited as VWPA].
2 .Id § 5 (codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 3579-3580 (1982)).
3 568 F. Supp. 516 (N.D. Ala. 1983), appeal docketed, No. 83-7444 (11th Cir. Aug. 8,
1983).
4 VWPA, supra note 1, § 2(b)(1).
5 Id § 3 (amending FED. R. CRIM. P. 32(c)).
6 Id § 4 (codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 1512-1515 (1982)).
7 Id § 6, 48 Fed. Reg. 33,774 (1983).
8 Id § 7 ;seealso note 117 infa.
9 Id § 5 (codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 3579-3580 (1982)).
10 568 F. Supp. at 534.
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amendments. I I
Part I of this note presents an historical overview of restitution
and a discussion of current restitution programs. Part II outlines and
discusses the VWPA. Finally, Parts III and IV focus on Weden, criti-
cally analyzing the decision and concluding that the restitution pro-
visions of the Act should have survived the Weden court's
constitutional test.
I. Restitution - An Overview
"History suggests that growing interest in the reformation of
the criminal is matched by decreasing care for the victim. ' 12
The principal reaction to "crime" in primitive society was retali-
ation by the victim against the offender. As the collective order
grew, the concept of "blood-feud" replaced private revenge. Those
with familial or tribal ties ("blood ties") to the victim sought revenge
against the group whose member perpetrated the crime. The harsh
and destructive blood-feud eventually gave way to a process known
as composition, with the offending group paying the victim pursuant
to an agreement produced by negotiations between the two groups. 13
The advent of economic stability has been credited with spanning
the transition from blood-feud to composition. 14 The system of com-
position, said to have begun in the Middle Ages primarily in Ger-
manic areas, marked the beginning of restitution in a proper sense, 15
that is, as being closely related to the concept of punishment.16 Later
refined to the point where every injury was deemed worth a codified
amount of money, composition reduced the chances of the "perpet-
ual vendetta," often a consequence of the blood-feud. 17 Offenders
unable to pay the ordered composition were branded outlaws and
banished from their community.'
8
This early system of restitution largely disappeared when the
state became the administrator of the criminal law. In feudal times,
iI Id at 535.
12 S. SCHAFER, COMPENSATION AND RESTITUTION TO VICTIMS OF CRIME 12 (2d ed.
1970).
13 Jacob, The Concept of Restitution: An Historical Overview, in RESTITUTION IN CRIMINAL
JUS'ICE 45 (J. Hudson & B. Galaway eds. 1977).
14 Id
15 S. SCHAFER, supra note 12, at 3.
16 Id at 5.
17 Id
18 Id at 6. Schafer characterizes these laws of ancient communities as "not a law of
crimes but a law of torts." Id at 5.
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as the king or lord began to exercise more control, offenders not only
paid restitution to victims but also paid a sum to the king or lord as a
commission for effecting the reconciliation.' 9 The concept of com-
pensation or restitution eventually became separate from the crimi-
nal law and was embodied in the law of torts.
20
The dual criminal-civil system did and does not adequately
serve the crime victim.2 ' The victim may have neither the time nor
the money to expend for tort actions against offenders. Furthermore,
criminals may not have the resources to pay civil judgments.22 A
restitution system does, however, offer victims at least some hope of
reparation should the offender be caught and convicted. The over-
riding justification for a restitution system may be what one writer
called an intuitive sense of its rationality.23 In other words, it just
makes sense that offenders should pay or work after they are con-
victed in order to pay for the damage they caused. If the offender is
truly unable to pay, the victim could be compensated with public
funds, accumulated by the collection of fines.
24
Through the years many scholars and jurists have called for res-
titution provisions, but these calls have been largely unheeded. 25 Sir
Thomas More,2 6 Jeremy Bentham, 27 and others28 proposed various
19 Jacob, supra note 13, at 46-47.
20 Id at 47.
21 Id at 47-48; see Harland, Monetaq' Remedies for the Victims of Crime: Assessing the Role of
the Criminal Courts, 30 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 52 (1982).
22 Jacob, supra note 13, at 48.
23 Harland, Compensating the Victims of Crime, 14 GRIM. L. BULL. 203, 214 (1978); see also
Geis, Restitution by Criminal Ofenders: A Summay and Overview, in RESTITUTION IN CRIMINAL
JUSTIcE 147 (J. Hudson & B. Galaway eds. 1977) ("The advantages of restitution seem so
obvious that commentators find it barely believable at times that programs have not long
since been set into motion.").
24 Geis, supra note 23, at 147 (quoting a 1974 report of the Law Reform Commission of
Canada).
25 Jacob, supra note 13, at 48.
26 Id (citing T. MORE, UTOPIA 23-24 (J.C. Collins ed. 1904), in which More urged that
offenders pay their victims, earning the funds by public works).
27 Id (citing J. HUDSON & B. GALAWAY, CONSIDERING THE VICTIM: SELECTED READ-
INGS IN RESTITUTION AND VICTIM COMPENSATION 3-4 (1975), in which Bentham is said to
have proposed mandatory restitution by convicted offenders and publicly funded compensa-
tion for victims whose offenders went unapprehended).
28 Id at 48-50 (citing J. HUDSON & B. GALAWAY, supra note 27, at xx, in which French-
man Bonneville de Marsengy is said to have asserted society's duty to crime victims as part of
a social contract. Like Bentham, de Marsengy believed that if offenders were not available to
provide restitution, society must.). In the late 1800's penologists of the world argued over
proposals to order prisoners to pay earnings to their victims; to condition sentence suspensions
on restitution; or to employ publicly funded compensation programs to benefit those victims
unable to garner payments from offenders through the criminal justice system. In 1927, En-
rico Fermi noted the demoralizing position in which the system placed victims forced to seek
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restitution and compensation systems to benefit crime victims and to
fulfill what they believed was society's obligation to those victims.
In more recent years, Englishwoman Margery Fry spoke out for
victims' rights.2 9 At first Fry urged reform of the criminal justice sys-
tem through a system of restitution aimed not only at aiding victims
but at rehabilitating offenders.3 0 In fact, Fry originally espoused res-
titution primarily for its rehabilitative benefits. Later, she became
disenchanted with the rehabilitative aspects of restitution and began
to advocate a state-funded compensation scheme. Fry believed such
a scheme was justified because society owed something to its citizens
when they suffered as victims of crime.
31
Margery Fry has been credited with launching a movement in
the 1950's that led initially to the enactment of victim compensation
laws in New Zealand and Great Britain,32 and eventually in the
United States, Australia, and Canada.33 These compensation plans
are generally civil in nature34 and quite unlike the punitive restitu-
tion sentences imposed under the criminal justice system. In modern
parlance, "restitution" is typically viewed as an offender-oriented
sanction: the offender pays the crime victim under the supervision of
the criminal justice system. Conversely, "compensation" is a state-
administered, and state-funded program: the state pays the victims
for losses suffered at the hands of criminals.
35
restitution in the civil courts. Fermi recommended the state impose a strict obligation upon
offenders to pay victims damages especially since society had the greater interest in prosecut-
ing criminals. Jacob, supra note 13, at 49-50.
29 Jacob, supra note 13, at 51 (citing M. FRY, ARMS OF THE LAW (1951)). Fry conceded
that restitution would not undo the wrong but it would serve to educate the offender and
provide a first step toward reformation for the offender. She called restitution the ideal solu-
tion. H. EDELHERTZ & G. GELS, PUBLIC COMPENSATION TO VICTIMS OF CRIME 10 (1974)
(quoting M. FRY, ARMS OF THE LAW (1951)).
30 Jacob, supra note 13, at 51 (citing Fry,Justice for Vctzns, The Observer (London), July
7, 1957).
31 Jacob, supra note 13, at 51. Writing from her British perspective, Fry advocated state-
funded compensation to supplement national insurance benefits and possible restitution from
the offender. With her changed attitude regarding restitution's viability, Fry noted that a
compensation program would also serve to appease victims psychologically, quelling 'the nat-
ural sense of outrage.' H. EDELHERTZ & G. GEIS, supra note 29, at 10.
32 H. EDELHERTZ & G. GEIS, supra note 29, at 11-12.
33 Jacob, supra note 13, at 52 (Fry's writings led to the adoption of victim-compensation
programs in New Zealand, Great Britain, the United States, Australia and Canada.). For a
list and discussion of compensation programs enacted in the United States, see Hoelzel, A
Survey of 27 Victim Compensation Programs, 63 JUDICATURE 485 (1980).
34 See text accompanying note 24 supra.
35 Colson & Benson, Restitution as an Alternative to Imprisonment, 1980 DET. C.L. REv. 523,
526 n.9; see also A. CAMPBELL, LAW OF SENTENCING § 10, at 49 (1978) (Employed inter-
changeably with the term "reparation," restitution is court-ordered compensation to an of-
[1984]
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In addition to these compensation laws,36 some states have en-
acted restitution statutes which give state courts a restitution sentenc-
ing option.3 7 The state of Washington, for example, permits
Washington's courts to order, in lieu of an otherwise prescribed fine,
that restitution be paid by persons who "through commission of
crime" have gained money or caused a victim to lose money or prop-
erty.38 A Washington criminal court may order restitution of up to
double the gain or loss.3 9 Several other states have enacted restitu-
tion statutes which allow courts to order restitution in addition to or
in lieu of otherwise prescribed sentences. 40
Some state statutes allow the defendant to be heard only if he
questions the imposition, amount or distribution of restitution.41
Others mandate hearings.42 Most of these laws leave the resolution
fender's victim for the damage caused by the offender's unlawful conduct.); Harland, supra
note 23, at 204 ("Victim compensation" refers to state-funded programs whereas "restitution"
indicates money or services provided by offenders as directed by the criminal justice system.);
Hudson & Galaway, Introduction, in RESTITUTION IN CRIMINAL JUSTICE 1 (J. Hudson and B.
Galaway eds. 1977) (Restitution involves offender reparation as part of the sanction imposed
and supervised by criminal justice officials.); Nader & Combs-Schilling, Restitution in Cross-
Cultural Perspective, in RESTITUTION IN CRIMINAL JUSTICE 27, 27-28 (J. Hudson & B.
Galaway eds. 1977) (The accepted usage of the terms in America remains: compensation
refers to money or services paid by the state or by the offender to the state; restitution refers to
money or services paid by the offender to the victim.).
36 See Hoelzel, supra note 33; see also Brown, Wisconsin's Victim Compensation Program, 63
JUDICATURE 497 (1980) (Under the Wisconsin plan, victims may receive awards of up to
$10,000 for medical expenses or lost wages and up to $2,000 for burial expenses from a state
fund administered by the Crime Victims Compensation Bureau.); Konig, Compensation for Vic-
lias of Crime-The Texas Approach, 34 Sw. L.J. 689 (1980) (Texas' Crime Victims Compensa-
tion Act mandates compensation for victims of violent crime only for pecuniary loss incurred
as a result of physical injuries.); Note, The 1981 Oklahoma Crine Victim Compensation Act, 17
TULSA LJ. 260 (1981) (Oklahoma law provides that victims be compensated from a fund
financed through assessments imposed on offenders in addition to court costs and fines.).
37 See, e.g., ALA. CODE §§ 15-18-65 to -78 (1982 & Supp. 1983); ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 13-603.C (Supp. 1983-1984); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 775.089 (West Supp. 1983); HAwAII REV.
STAT. § 706-605(1)(e) (Supp. 1982); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 1005-5-6 (Smith-Hurd 1982);
KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 431.200 (Baldwin 1983); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, §§ 132 1-
1330 (1983 & Supp. 1983-1984); Miss. CODE ANN. §§ 99-37-1 to -23 (Supp. 1983); Mo. ANN.
STAT. §§ 546.630, .640 (Vernon 1953); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:43-3 (West 1982); OHIO REV.
CODE ANN. § 2929.11 (Page Supp. 1982); OR. REV. STAT. §§ 137.103, .106, .109 (1981); PA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 1106 (Purdon 1983); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-3-201 (Supp. 1983);
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9A.20.030 (Supp. 1983-1984).
38 WASH: REV. CODE ANN. § 9A.20.030(1) (Supp. 1983-1984).
39 Id
40 See note 37 supra (all listed statutes except Washington's).
41 See, e.g., OR. REV. STAT. § 137.106(3) (1981); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-3-201(3)(c)
(Supp. 1983).
42 See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 15-18-67 (1982); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 1005-5-6(a) (Smith-
Hurd 1982).
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of restitution issues to the discretion of the criminal court sentencing
judge,43 but both Kentucky4 and Missouri45 require that juries be
impaneled to ascertain the restitution amount if the defendant dis-
putes the issue. Some state statutes provide criteria which the judge
must consider when assessing the evidence before the court on the
restitution issue. For example, Alabama law mandates consideration
of the victim's and the defendant's financial resources, the defend-
ant's ability to pay, the anticipated rehabilitative effect of the man-
ner or method of payment, the burden or hardship imposed upon the
victim as a result of the defendant's criminal acts, and the mental,
physical and financial condition of the victim.
46
To enforce the restitution order, some state statutes permit the
courts to employ their contempt power, 47 revoke probation, parole,
43 Some states do not provide any dispute resolution procedure. See, e.g., ARIz. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 13-603.C (Supp. 1983-1984) (The statute states that a "court shall require...
restitution. . . in such an amount and manner as the court may order."); FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 775.089(1) and (3) (West Supp. 1983) (Without detailing any dispute resolution procedure,
the law provides that a court may consider restitution in addition to other punishment. After
its imposition, a defendant may petition the court for "remission" or modification if defend-
ant can show undue hardship.); HAWAIi REV. STAT. § 706-605(1)(e) (Supp. 1982) (A court
may sentence convicted persons to make restitution in an amount the person can afford to
pay.); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, §§ 1152 2-A., 1323 1., 1323"2. (1983 & Supp. 1983-
1984) (Every natural person convicted of a crime may be required to make restitution. The
court shall make inquiries of the prosecutor, police officer, or victim with respect to the vic-
tim's loss. The court must state in open court or in writing reasons for not imposing restitu-
tion.); NJ. STAT. ANN. § 2C:43-3 (West 1982) (Courts may sentence convicted persons to pay
fines or make restitution or both, but restitution may be in an amount no greater than the
victim's loss. The statute contains no imposition procedure guide.); OHIO REv. STAT.
§ 2929.11(A),(E) (Page Supp. 1982) (Those guilty of felonies may be required to make restitu-
tion as fixed by the court. If the victim is more than 65 years old or totally disabled, the court
shall consider this fact in favor of imposing restitution.); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 1106(a)
(Purdon 1983) (Any offender convicted of a crime resulting in personal injury or property loss
or damage may be sentenced to make restitution in addition to other punishment.).
44 Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 431.200 (Baldwin 1983) (Restitution shall be ordered when-
everpropery damage results from a misdemeanor or felony. If defendant does not agree to the
restitution amount a jury shall be impaneled to try the facts and ascertain the amount of
property damage or loss.).
45 Mo. ANN. STAT. § 546.640 (Vernon 1953) (Felon must restore property or make repa-
rations. If the defendant does not agree with amount determined, a jury shall be impaneled
to try the facts and ascertain the value and amount of the property or assess the damages.).
46 ALA. CODE § 15-18-68 (1982).
47 See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 775.089(5) (West Supp. 1983) (While a Florida court may
enforce an order with its contempt power, if the court finds the convict has made a good faith
effort to comply, the court may increase the time for payment, reduce the amount due, or
grant remission.); MISS. CODE ANN. §§ 99-37-5, -7, -9 (Supp. 1983) ("Contempt" means in-
tentional refusal or no good faith effort to comply. Upon motion by the court or the District
Attorney, the convict must show cause as to why he should not be found in contempt of court.
The court may order the person committed until payment is made. Section 99-37-9 limits the
amount of contempt jail-time; no greater than one day for each $25.00 due under a restitu-
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or prison sentence suspension,48 or allow victims to bring a civil ac-
tion to enforce restitution orders.49 Some state statutes fail to specify
any enforcement procedures.
50
Since 1925, the Federal Probation Act5' has permitted federal
courts to issue restitution orders as a condition of probation. Courts
have held that this power is not a use of the criminal process to en-
force a debt. These courts have reasoned that when a court revokes
probation upon an offender's failure to pay restitution, the imprison-
ment is punishment for the original crime and not for the failure to
honor the restitution debt. 52 Under the Probation Act, the sentenc-
ing court must first assess the offender's financial capacity.55 In addi-
tion, the court may not order payment of an amount greater than
"actual damages or loss caused by the offenses for which conviction
was had."'5 4 In 198355 and 1984,56 Congress also considered legisla-
tion order; no greater than 30 days if misdemeanor conviction; no greater than one year
otherwise.); PA. STAT. ANN. tit 18, § 1106(f) (Purdon 1983) (The probation section, which
receives the restitution payments and passes them on to the victim[s] under § 1106(e), must
notify the state district court within 20 days of a convict's failure to make restitution pay-
ments. If the convict fails to pay within 20 days hence, he is cited for contempt of the district
court, and the contempt case is forwarded to the court of common pleas for a hearing.).
48 See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 15-18-72 (1982) (Probation or parole may be revoked if restitu-
tion serves as a condition.); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 1005-5-6(d) (Smith-Hurd 1982) (Where
conditions of payment are not satisfied, the court can allow a greater time for payment, up to
2 years more than the original order allowed. If the offender violates the payment conditions
during the additional period, the court may revoke the sentence or enlarge the conditions.).
49 See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 775.089(6) (West Supp. 1983) (Upon default by the of-
fender, the defaulted payments may be collected "by any means authorized by law for en-
forcement of a judgment."); MISS CODE ANN. § 99-37-13 (Supp. 1983) (Default may be
collected "by any means authorized by law.").
50 See, e.g., ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-603.C (Supp. 1983-1984); HAWAIi REV. STAT.
§ 706-605(l)(e) (Supp. 1982).
51 18 U.S.C. § 3651 (1982).
52 A. CAMPBELL, srupra note 35, § 23, at 89.
53 Id
54 Id at 90 (citing 18 U.S.C.S. § 3651 (Law. Co-op. 1974)).
55 See, e.g., H.R. 3498, 98th Cong., 1st Sess., 129 CONG. REc. H4895 (daily ed. Oct. 28,
1983) (This proposed legislation, which was reported to the House Committee on the Judici-
ary, would make state compensation programs eligible for federal grants of up to fifty percent
of the cost of compensating .victims and up to one hundred percent of the cost of compensat-
ing victims of crimes subject to exclusive federal jurisdiction.); see also S. 1941, 98th Cong., Ist
Sess., 129 CONG. REc. S13767 (daily ed. Oct. 6, 1983) (Reported to the Senate Judiciary
Committee, like the House version, S. 1941 would establish a Crime Victim's Assistance Fund
which would receive fines collected from federal offenders. The funds would be distributed to
state compensation programs-up to fifty percent of the awards granted to victims by the
qualifying state programs with up to one hundred percent of the awards granted by states for
victims of federal offenses.).
Under both H.R. 3498 and S. 1941, only approved state compensation programs could
receive the federal supplementing funds. Approved programs, under the proposed legislation,
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tion aimed at supplementing approved state compensation programs
with federal funds.
Other nations have employed restitution in various forms. In
his book, Compensation and Restitution to Victims of Cnr'ne, Stephen
Schaefer offers a comparative summary in which he classifies into
five categories the systems used to provide restitution or compensa-
tion to crime victims. 57 The five categories include: (1) civil dam-
ages awarded only in civil proceedings; 58 (2) civil restitution (non-
punitive) awarded in criminal proceedings; 59 (3) civil restitution (pu-
nitive) awarded in criminal proceedings; 60  (4) civil compensation
would include those state compensation programs that: offered compensation for medical
expenses; promoted "victim cooperation with reasonable requests of law enforcement offi-
cials"; diminished compensation to victims guilty of "contributory misconduct"; subrogated
the state to claims a compensation recipient may acquire against the offender; did not dis-
criminate against non-residents of the state; provided compensation to victims of exclusive
federal-jurisdiction crimes.).
56 See, e.g., S. 2423, 98th Cong., 2d Sess., 129 CONG. REc. S2633 (daily ed. Mar. 13, 1984)
(This Act would establish a Crime Victims' Assistance Fund to assist: (1) states with eligible
victim compensation programs; (2) non-profit or public agencies who assist victims of crime;
and (3) federal law enforcement agencies and federal crime victims through state programs.
The Crime Victims' Assistance Fund would receive all criminal fines collected from convicted
federal defendants and all proceeds of contracts entered into by federal defendants for the
purpose of selling literary or other rights to their "crime story." See note 117 i)nfa.
Under S. 2423, "approved" state programs would include those that provide: the same
financial benefits to non-resident crime victims; the same financial benefits to victims of fed-
eral crimes committed in the state as are provided state crime victims; and, compensation for
mental health counselling required by eligible individuals as a result of their victimization.
57 S. SCHAFER, supra note 12, at 102.
58 Id at 103. In the first type of restitution or compensation system, the civil and crimi-
nal wrongs are adjudicated in separate proceedings. In Schafer's 1970 account, he lists India,
Pakistan, New Zealand, and the federal system in the United States as the only systems utiliz-
ing this "purely civil solution" to resolve the restitution question. As Schaefer writes, federal
law "does not provide for civil parties in criminal proceedings." Id. at 62.
59 Id at 103. In the second type of system, the victim's claims for restitution may be
heard by the criminal court during the criminal proceedings. The criminal trial takes prior-
ity, and the court views the restitution issue as a tangential civil one. The civil claim need not
be brought into the criminal proceeding by the victim, and the court may in some cases refuse
to hear this civil restitution claim. Judicial economy appears to be the overriding justification
for this system, which is in use in the Dominican Republic, England, France, Germany, Hol-
land, Hungary, Israel, Norway, and Sweden. Schafer labels this method the "most usual
treatment" of the restitution question.
60 Id at 104. Schafer divides his third system of restitution, in which the criminal court
judge orders punitive restitution, into three sub-systems. Under the laws in the first sub-
system, the offender must pay money to indemnify the victim only in addition to otherwise
prescribed punishment. Germany, Sweden, Mexico, and some of the United States have
passed laws of this type. See, e.g., PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 1106(a) (Purdon 1983); OR. REV.
STAT. § 137.106(1) (1981). Section 5 of the VWPA allows federal courts to order restitution
"in addition to or in lieu of any other penalty authorized by law." 18 U.S.C. § 3579(a)(1)
(1982).
The second sub-category of laws include those that allow courts to order offenders to pay
[1984]
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"awarded in criminal proceedings and backed by the resources of the
state"; 61 and, (5) compensation "awarded through a special
procedure. '62
No historical overview of restitution would be complete without
a discussion of the purposes behind the theory of restitution. Alan T.
Harland, an associate professor at the Department of Criminal Jus-
tice at Temple University, writes that this question has an impact
beyond the academic. 63 For example, courts have justified the use of
restitution as a condition of probation without statutory authority
because of restitution's utility as a rehabilitative tool. And, courts
have justified using a lower level of appellate scrutiny for restitution
awards, "a creative alternative to incarceration," than they would
have applied to a "punitive" sentence.6
Burt Galaway, a member of the University of Minnesota faculty
and author of numerous articles on restitution and victim compensa-
tion, listed five possible purposes for restitution:65 (1) redress for vic-
tims; (2) rehabilitation for offenders; (3) reduction of the need for
vengeance by the victim; (4) less severe and more humane sanctions
double or triple the amount necessary to merely indemnify a victim. Some states have en-
acted laws of this type. S. SCHAFER, sufira note 12, at 105; see, e.g., WASH. REv. CODE ANN.
§ 9A.20.030(1) (Supp. 1983-1984) (Court may order, in lieu of a fine, restitution of up to
double the victim's loss from the crime's commission.); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-3-201(3)(a)
(Supp. 1983) (In addition to any other sentence, the court may order restitution of up to
double the amount of "pecuniary damages.").
The third sub-category of laws (again seen in some American states) include those enact-
ments which allow restitution agreements in lieu of criminal proceedings and punishments.
S. SCHAEFER, sfupra note 12, at 105.
61 S. SCHAFER, upra note 12, at 105-06. Schafer's fourth system, employed in Cuba, is
one in which the law provides for compensation awards in criminal proceedings, but the state
pays the victim from a fund. The awards are determined in criminal court, but the victim's
receipt of the award does not depend upon the offender's solvency. The state "reimburses"
itself by bringing an action against the offender for the compensation amount and depositing
receipts into the fund. Schafer says this uniform system, "enshrined in the constitutional law
of the country," implies the notion that whenever a citizen suffers as a victim of crime, the
state failed in its duty toward its citizens by not preventing the crime. Id at 106.
62 Id at 106. The fifth type of system includes those laws under which restitution is
procured in a separate proceeding, not involving a civil or criminal tribunal. The state com-
pensates victims. Sweden and many of the American states employ this system.
Of the 27 state compensation systems listed and discussed in Hoelzel's article, .'upra note
33, at 486, only four programs, those in Illinois, Massachusetts, Ohio, and Tennessee, are
administered by courts. The balance are administered by newly established administrative
agencies, the state Workman's Compensation Division, Industrial Accident Board, and the
like.
63 Harland, supra note 21, at 126.
64 Id
65 Galaway, Toward the Rational Develofpment of Restitution, in RESTITUTION IN CRIMINAL
JUSTICE 77, 82-83 (J. Hudson & B. Galaway eds. 1977).
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for offenders; and, (5) reduced demand upon the criminal justice sys-
tem. As Galaway suggests, arguments can be made for all these
"purposes" and it would seem that one can tailor individual pro-
grams to justify one or some of them.
66
Offenders are, however, rarely apprehended and convicted and
those that are may not possess sufficient assets to adequately compen-
sate victims. A relatively small percentage of victims would benefit
from a pure restitution program which relied upon payments from
convicted offenders to their victims. 67 Despite the incomplete cover-
age afforded victims under a restitution program, the United States
Congress believed it should be part of a government attempt to in-
demnify victims of crime, and in 1982, Congress enacted legislation
which served to expand the power of federal judges to grant victims
restitution.
II. The Victim and Witness Protection Act of 1982
On April 22, 1982, Senators Heinz and Laxalt introduced the
VWPA.68 The Act's declared purpose "is to strengthen existing legal
protections for victims and witnesses of Federal crimes and require
the United States Attorney General to develop additional legislative
proposals and guidelines toward this end."
'69
Senator Heinz asserted that most victims of crime are victimized
twice, once by the criminal and once by the criminal justice system.
70
Arguing that victims must be given "at least the rights now afforded
routinely to the accused," he called it inexcusable that victims rou-
66 Id at 83.
67 Id. at 82 ("If the primary social objective is protecting the welfare of crime victims,
then other programs-such as public victim compensation-are likely to become more effec-
tive than offender restitution."); see also 128 CONG. REc. H 8202 (daily ed. Sept. 30, 1982) (In
his statement explaining the VWPA, Rep. Rodino warned against "false hopes ... that
restitution is a panacea for the financial ills of crime victims." Rodino pointed out that resti-
tution is only possible when the wrongdoer is caught, convicted, and "possesses the resources
to make it." Restitution "cannot reasonably be expected to benefit the majority of crime
victims." Rodino called upon Congress to enact legislation aimed at assisting states-more
than 30 of which have set up victim compensation programs-in their compensation efforts.
See notes 55-56 supra for a brief description of proposed legislation; Harland, supra note 21, at
59 (Harland cites one commentator's complete dismissal of restitution "because few defend-
ants have sufficient financial resources."); D. CARROW, CRIME VICTIM COMPENSATION 10
(report to the U.S. Dept. of Justice 1980) (The fact that restitution only assists victims when
offenders are apprehended and convicted, serves as restitution's "most limiting" barrier.).
68 VWPA, supra note 1; seealso S. REP. No. 532, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 10, reprinted in 1983
U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 2515, 2516 [hereinafter cited as SENATE REPORT].
69 SENATE REPORT, supra note 68, at 9.
70 128 CONG. REC. S13063 (daily ed. Oct. 1, 1982) ("This bill takes a long step forward
in preventing that second crime.").
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tinely reported to court only to find the court date changed, that the
system forced victims to share courtroom waiting areas with their
accused offenders, that offenders could spend and enjoy money
gained from crime when victims received no restitution, and that
prosecutors and parole boards considered sentencing and release
dates without considering the victim and his or her circumstances.
71
Consistent with its purpose, the Act has three fundamental
objectives: to improve and protect the role of victims in the federal
criminal justice system; to assist witnesses and victims without in-
fringing on the constitutional rights of accused offenders; and to pro-
vide a model for action by state and local officials.72 These objectives
are apparent from the substantive provisions of the VWPA and from
the legislative history behind them.
A. Section 3 Victim Impact Statement
Section 3, the first substantive provision of the VWPA,73 amends
the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.74 Effective for all
presentence reports ordered on or after March 1, 1983,75 the new
Rule 32(c)(2) requires that presentence reports contain a statement
of the circumstances of the offense, the circumstances affecting the
defendant's behavior, information regarding the "financial, social,
psychological and physical harm" done to any victim as well as any
other information which could aid the court in sentencing, "includ-
ing the restitution needs of any victim. ' 76
The Judiciary Committee wrote in the Senate Report that the
victim impact statement serves as a first step toward insuring the vic-
tim's side is heard and considered. 77 Further, they urged that addi-
tional techniques already available, such as victim allocution at
sentencing and prosecution-victim consultation concerning plea bar-
gaining, be employed to the same end.78 The Committee also stated
that the victim impact statement should be used whenever an institu-
71 128 CONG. REc. S11434 (daily ed. Sept. 14, 1982). Senator Laxalt considered the role
of the victim in the criminal justice system and asserted that we must take better care of
victims if we want an effective system. Laxalt said the system that depends upon the victim
to "sign complaints, identify the accused and to testify for the prosecution," has forgotten and
neglected them. Id at S 11435.
72 Id at S11437.
73 VWPA § 3.
74 Id; see also FED. R. CRIM. P. 32(c)(2).
75 VWPA § 9(b)(1).
76 Id § 3.
77 SENATE REPORT, supra note 68, at 13.
78 Id
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tion is victimized and human victims can be found (perhaps the tell-
ers of a robbed bank). The Committee noted that the term "victim"
includes indirect victims, such as a homicide victim's family mem-
bers. 79 Finally, the Committee cautioned that "need" as used in the
phrase "restitution needs of any victim" should not be construed -to
mean that only "needy" victims may receive restitution. 80
B. Section 4 Protection of Victims and Witnesses From Intimidation
The first two provisions of section 4 create new offenses under
Title 18 of the United States Code. Section 15121 of the Code out-
laws the intimidation or harassment of witnesses, victims, or infor-
mants before the federal witness or victim testifies or the informant
informs. Section 151382 prohibits retaliation against federal wit-
nesses, victims, or informants after those persons have testified or in-
formed. A third provision of section 4 enables United States district
courts to issue, upon the application of a government attorney, tem-
porary restraining orders or protective orders to prevent the harass-
ment or intimidation of witnesses or victims.
83
C. Section 5 Restitution
Section 5 of the VWPA,8 4 the major focus of this note, deals
with restitution and the procedure for ordering it. In a statement
before the House of Representatives, Representative Rodino, the
chairman of the House Judiciary Committee, asserted that a purpose
of the federal criminal justice system ought to be making "the victim
financially whole."8s But Rodino recognized that restitution cannot
reasonably be expected to benefit the majority of crime victims. Of-
fenders must first be caught and convicted, and even then, the of-
fender may not possess the assets to make restitution. To remedy the
inadequate coverage afforded by restitution, Rodino suggested that
Congress act to assist states in providing victim compensation
programs.8 6
79 Id
80 Id ("[T]he committee does not intend to limit restitution to the financially needy.").
81 18 U.S.C. § 1512 (1982).
82 Id § 1513.
83 Id § 1514.
84 VWPA § 5.
85 128 CONG. REc. H8201 (daily ed. Sept. 30, 1982) ("The person who should be respon-
sible for doing this is the wrongdoer, the person who caused the loss.").
86 Id at H8202. Although the VWPA addresses criminal restitution, Senator Heinz called
a federal policy on victim compensation "a great need" and marked it as one of the three
important areas not addressed in the Act. The other two "great needs" identified by Heinz:
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Senator Laxalt noted that under pre-Act law, courts were al-
lowed to order restitution but rarely did.8 7 Due in part to judges'
inability to order restitution in conjunction with a prison sentence,
Congress sought in section 5 of the Act to "remedy this injustice" by
adding sections 3579 and 3580 to Title 18. The goal: to make resti-
tution the expected norm and not an afterthought."" Pre-Act federal
law did and does allow a restitution order as condition to a probation
term.89 Congress, however, wanted to go further. In its report, the
Senate cited the integral role restitution once played in criminal jus-
tice systems of "virtually every culture and every time" and lamented
its current infrequent and indifferent use.90
Section 3579 allows federal courts to order persons convicted of
any Title 18 offense, or aircraft piracy under Title 49, to make resti-
tution to "any victim of the offense." 91 Should the court refuse to
order restitution or order only "partial" restitution, the court must
state its reasons on the record.92 Requiring the court to explain its
failure to order total restitution is yet another example of Congress'
desire to make restitution the expected norm.93 Under section 3579
the restitution may be made in money or, if the victim or his estate
consents, in services, and the restitution may be made to another per-
son or organization designated by the victim or victim's estate. 94 Ad-
(1) relocation of witnesses to prevent harassment and intimidation after the decision is made
to testify; and (2) legal redress for persons injured when "a negligent government official," for
example, releases a dangerous person from federal prison. 128 CONG. REC. S13062-63 (daily
ed. Oct. 1, 1982). See notes 55-56 supra for a discussion of proposed federal legislation con-
cerning victim compensation.
87 128 CONG. REc. S13064 (daily ed. Oct. 1, 1982) (Sen. Laxalt probably refers here to
the Federal Probation Act provision (18 U.S.C. § 3651 (1982)) allowing federal courts to or-
der restitution as a condition of probation.). In general, absent statutory authority, criminal
courts do not have the authority to order restitution. Harland, supra note 21, at 57-58.
88 128 CONG. REc. S13063 (daily ed. Oct. 1, 1982).
89 18 U.S.C. § 3651 (1982) ("While on probation and among the conditions thereof, the
defendant . . . [m]ay be required to make restitution or reparation to aggrieved parties for
actual damages or loss caused by the offense for which conviction was had.").
90 SENATE REPORT, sura note 68, at 30. Some would dispute this assertion that restitu-
tion has played a role in every time. See notes 20-31 and accompanying text.
91 18 U.S.C. § 3579(a)(1) (1982). One Senate version of the Act limited restitution to
Title 18 offenses. The version enacted added certain Title 49 offenses to aid people victimized
by airline hijacking. 128 CONG. RE. S13063 (daily ed. Oct. 1, 1982). The Act fails however
to define "victim." One commentator, recognizing that § 3579(a)(1) speaks of the "victim of
the offense," described as problematic those situations involving victims of "offenses" for
which the defendants are not charged or convicted. Merritt, Corrections Law Developments: Res-
titution Under the Victim and Witness Protection Act of 1982, 20 CRIM. L. BULL 44, 46 (1984).
92 18 U.S.C. § 3579(a)(2) (1982).
93 128 CONG. REc. S13063 (daily ed. Oct. 1, 1982).
94 18 U.S.C. § 3579(b) (1982).
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ditionally, the restitution order must be as fair as possible to the
victim without unduly complicating or prolonging the sentencing
process.95 Representative McCollum called this a "logical limitation
on awarding restitution" which would preclude, for example, orders
with respect to speculative lost future wages.
96
Calling the difficult cases concerning precise amounts owed un-
usual, the Committee said courts are authorized by the Act to reach
expeditious and reasonable restitution determinations. 97 The section
3579 restitution order could be used to return property or compen-
sate victims for damaged property.98 If the victim suffered bodily
injury, the court could order the defendant to pay for physical, psy-
chiatric, or psychological care or treatment and reimburse the victim
for lost income.99 The court may also order the defendant to pay
necessary funeral and related services.'0 °
A court, however, may not order restitution to a victim who has
already received compensation, but may "in the interests of justice"
order that restitution be paid to the compensator.' 0 ' The compensa-
tors who may receive restitution payments, could include friends,
family, or other persons or organizations as well as insurance compa-
nies and state victim compensation programs. 0 2 To insure that vic-
tims do not receive double damages, restitution payments may be
set-off against damages won by the victim in federal or state civil
proceedings. 10 3 Further, the court may order that defendants make
installment payments or payment within a specified period. In any
case, payment must be made immediately or no later than the end of
any probation period, five years after imprisonment ends (if the court
does not order probation), or five years after sentencing.
0 4
If the defendant is placed on probation or parole under Title 18,
any restitution order automatically becomes a condition of the pro-
95 Id § 3579(d). This provision, directing restitution orders which are both fair to the
victim and "will not unduly complicate or prolong the sentencing process" has been
"credited" with causing some of the difficulty with the Act. See notes 147-48 infra and accom-
panying text.
96 128 CONG. REc. H8207 (daily ed. Sept. 30, 1982) (McCollum noted that such awards
could be obtained in civil actions.).
97 SENATE REPORT, supra note 68, at 31.
98 18 U.S.C. § 3579(b)(1) (1982).
99 Id § 3579(b)(2).
100 Id § 3579(b)(3).
101 Id. § 3579(e)(1).
102 SENATE REPORT, supra note 68, at 32-33.
103 18 U.S.C. § 3579(e)(2) (1982).




bation or parole.10 5 If the defendant fails to comply with the restitu-
tion order, the court may use that failure as grounds for revocation of
the probation and a parole board may do likewise concerning pa-
role. 06 Either the victim or the United States Government may en-
force a restitution order, in the same manner as a judgment in a civil
action is enforced.'0 7 Thus, according to the Senate Report, the Fed-
eral Rules of Civil Procedure apply in enforcement proceedings. Ar-
rest, attachment, garnishment, replevin, and sequestration are
available means to convince a recalcitrant defendant to comply with
a restitution order.
0 8
The second of section 5's two restitution provisions adds section
3580,109 the procedures provision. Section 3580 begins with a list of
factors which the court may consider when pondering the restitution
amount. These include: the victim's loss, the defendant's resources,
the defendant's dependents, "and such other factors the court deems
appropriate."' 10 The court can order the probation service to in-
clude in its pre-sentence report, or in a separate report, information
concerning these factors."' Additionally, both the defendant and
the government must have access to any report dealing with the
factors. 
11 2
Under section 3580, disputes concerning the amount or type of
restitution are to be resolved by the court; findings are to be based on
a preponderance of the evidence. The government has the burden of
proving the amount of the victim's loss, and the defendant bears the
burden of showing his financial resources and the needs of his depen-
dents. The burden concerning other matters shall be on the party
"designated by the court as justice requires."113
Finally, section 3580 directs that the defendant's conviction in-
105 Id § 3579(g). As indicated in Note, Restitution in the Criminal Process: Procedures for Fx-
ing the Ofinderr Liabilily, 93 YALE L.J. 505, 507 n.5 (1984), the Act did not specifically repeal
the restitution probation-condition of the Probation Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3651 (1982). Neverthe-
less, since any restitution ordered under the new § 3579 would be an automatic condition of
any probation granted, § 3579 would appear to "subsum[e] the former authority," § 3651.
But § 3651 permits the restitution condition whenever federal courts order probation. Thus,
§ 3651 still applies whenever conviction results from a non-Title 18 or aircraft piracy charge
(those offenses covered by § 3579).
106 18 U.S.C. § 3579(g) (1982).
107 Id § 3579(h).
108 SENATE REPORT, supra note 68, at 33.
109 18 U.S.C. § 3580 (1982).
110 Id § 3580(a).
111 Id § 3580(b).
112 Id § 3580(c).
113 Id § 3580(d).
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volving an act giving rise to restitution will serve "to estop the de-
fendant from denying the essential allegations of that offense in any
subsequent federal or state civil proceeding brought. . . by the vic-
tim.""114 Congress intended that the defendant's conviction would re-
lieve the victim of the need to establish a defendant's liability in a
civil suit., '5
Sections 6 and 7 of the VWPA make up the balance of the sub-
stantive provisions of the Act. Section 6 directs the Attorney General
to prepare guidelines for the fair treatment of crime victims and wit-
nesses in the federal criminal justice system.'1 6 Section 7 directs the
Attorney General to study and prepare a report regarding laws
which might prevent federal felons from profiting by the sale of their
story.
1 7
III. United States v. Weden
The restitution provisions of section 5 of the VWPA met their
first test in United States v. Welden.1 8 In Welden, the Federal District
Court for the Northern District of Alabama found the provisions
114 Id § 3580(e) (This section contains a caveat: The estoppel effect of the federal convic-
tion "giving rise to the restitution order" is allowed "to the extent consistent with state law.").
115 SENATE REPORT, supra note 68, at 32.
116 VWPA § 6. In § 6 of the VWPA, Congress directed that the Attorney General pre-
pare guidelines "consistent with the purposes" of the Act "to provide crime victims with
services and information to minimize the effects of the crime itself and provide realistic expec-
tations regarding victim's relationship to the criminal justice process." SENATE REPORT,
supra note 68, at 40. These guidelines were published in the Federal Register on July 25,
1983. 48 FED. REG. 33,774 (1983). The guidelines were included in the Wden court's opin-
ion. 568 F. Supp. at 520-25.
117 VWPA § 7. The Victims of Crime Assistance Act of 1984, S. 2423, 98th Cong., 2d
Sess., 129 CONG. REc. S2633 (daily ed. Mar. 13, 1984), would amend Title 18 of the United
States Code by adding Rule 32.2 to the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. The new rule
would allow federal courts to collect money which would otherwise be paid to the defendant
pursuant to contracts entered into "for the purpose of having his crime depicted in a movie,
book, newspaper, magazine, radio, or television production, or live entertainment of any kind,
or for the purpose of expressing his thoughts, opinions or emotions regarding such crime."
Money so collected would be deposited in the Crime Victim Assistance Fund for disburse-
ment in accordance with the provision of the balance of the Victims of Crime Assistance Act.
See note 56 supra.
Some states have enacted statutes, sometimes called "Son of Sam" legislation after the
infamous "Son of Sam" case and the subsequently-enacted New York law prohibiting
financial gain by felons from the tale of their "story." Heinz, The Victim and Witness Protection
Act of 1982, 29 PRAc. LAw. 13, 16-17 (1983). For a discussion of the New York statute, see
Note, Criminals-Trned-Authors: Victims'Rights v. Freedom of Speech, 54 IND. L.J. 443 (1979); see
also Note, Alabama's Anti-Profit Statute: A Recent Trend in Victim Compensation, 33 ALA. L. REV.
109 (1981).




void, declaring them unconstitutional. Asserting that Congress failed
to comprehend the full impact of the VWPA's victim restitution pro-
visions,119 Federal District Judge Acker of the Northern District of
Alabama concluded in Weden that both sections 3579 and 3580 were
unconstitutional, declaring them "null, void and of no force and ef-
fect.' 120 In Welden, three co-defendants were indicted under the fed-
eral kidnapping statute (18 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(1)). One victim was
killed, another sexually abused and stabbed and a third suffered
damage to his automobile. The jury convicted all three defendants:
Carlton Welden, Eugene Satterfield, and Perry Allison. 12' At the
July 15 sentencing hearing each defendant moved the court to de-
clare sections 3579 and 3580 unconstitutional. 22 Since the Title 18
crime of kidnapping was committed after January 1, 1983, the effec-
tive date of sections 3579 and 3580, the Act's restitution provisions
applied. 23 The court thus felt compelled to address their constitu-
tionality. 24 Judge Acker considered himself the first to be called
upon to assess the constitutionality of the new VWPA.125
119 Id at 530.
120 Id at 536.
121 Id at 517.
122 Id
123 VWPA § 9(b)(2) ('The amendments made by Section 5 of this Act shall apply with
respect to offenses occurring on or after January 1, 1983.").
124 568 F. Supp. at 517-18.
125 Id at 535-36. The Tenth Circuit is presently considering an appeal in United States v.
Richard, No. 83-C.R. 114 (D. Colo. 1983), in which the defendant Richard was convicted in
federal court of armed robbery and ordered to pay $5000 in restitution within five years from
the end of his prison term. Brief for Appellee at 11, United States v. Richard, appeal docketed,
No. 83-1903 (10th Cir. Jan. 30, 1984) [hereinafter cited as Brief for Appellee (Richard)]. Pur-
suant to the restitution provisions of the VWPA the district court heard evidence regarding
restitution at the sentencing hearing. Without dispute, the defendant agreed to pay $328.62
for bank-employee salaries for non-productive work time after the robbery. Id at 6. The
defendant, however, did dispute the victim bank's claimed total robbery loss of $13,326. Id
at 4, 11. The defendant, employing a disguise, robbed the bank, escaped to a nearby men's
room and stashed his disguise and more than $100,000 in cash in a wall compartment in the
men's room. Id at 9. Police later recovered the money from the men's room. A subsequent
bank audit revealed a loss of approximately $13,000 after accounting for the money recovered
from the men's room. Id at 10. The defendant, claiming he stashed all the stolen money in
the men's room, faulted the bank's audit. The court found "by a preponderance of the evi-
dence" the loss to be $13,326 but, in considering defendant's financial condition and twelve-
year prison term only ordered partial restitution of $5,000. Id at 11.
In Richard, the defense not only appealed the restitution order but also attacked the
constitutionality of the restitution provisions of the Act, §§ 3579-3580; Brief for Appellant at
13, United States v. Richard, appealdocketed, No. 83-1903 (10th Cir. Jan. 30, 1984) [hereinafter
cited as Brief for Appellant (Richard)]. Since the defense failed to raise the constitutionality of
the Act at trial or during sentencing proceedings, the government asserted that the defendant
cannot make such claims for the first time on appeal. Brief for Appellee (Richard) at 12. The
defense claimed the court should consider the constitutional issues anyway, "to prevent mani-
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At the sentencing hearing the probation service submitted to the
court a victim impact statement as required by the Act's amendment
of the Federal Rules. 126 The court refused to accept as accurate the
report that victim Pauline Calloway, the sexually abused and beaten
young woman should be awarded only $599 in medical expenses.
127
Further, the court lamented the probation service's failure to con-
sider as victims either Calloway's allegedly murdered boyfriend, his
estate, or Mr. Devin Little, the man whose car the defendants dam-
aged. 128 Judge Acker wrote that it would be unconscionable to
award Calloway $599 and Hill's estate not "one dime."'
29
In assessing the financial condition of the defendants, the proba-
tion service reported that Welden's net worth was $23,200 while both
Allison and Satterfield had minus net worths. 30 Judge Acker found
fest injustice." Brief for Appellant (Richard) at 13. Basing his claim on the notion that
§ 3579(h) of the Act makes a restitution order a civil judgment, the defendant claimed that
the Act violated his fifth amendment due process and equal protection rights. The defense
faulted the summary manner in which courts may order restitution-the civil judgment.
Thus, according to Richard, the Act has deprived him of due process since it fails to provide
the process normally attendant to a civilfproceeding. Id at 14. The defense did not claim the
Act violated the seventh amendment jury trial right since Richard did not request a jury trial
on the restitution issue. Id at 15.
The defense in Richard also urged the Tenth Circuit to reverse the restitution order on
the grounds that, under § 3579(d), the district court should have refused to impose an order
since it would "unduly complicate or prolong the sentencing process." Id at 11. Richard
argued that, due to the complexities, a restitution determination would, if properly consid-
ered, result in a mini-trial for damages, and thus the court should have sentenced Richard
without ordering restitution. Id at 12-13. A properly considered restitution order, according
to Richard, could only "unduly complicate or prolong the sentencing process." Id at 13. The
government countered, asserting that Richard was given more substantial rights at the actual
sentencing hearing than normally accrue at sentencing. "An additional trial would produce
nothing more." Brief for Appellee (Richard) at 24.
126 568 F. Supp. at 525.
127 Id. Referring to Miss Calloway's "state of hysteria" upon escape and her visible shak-
ing on the witness stand, Judge Acker "strongly suspect[ed]" she would need counseling for a
long time, implying that the $599 restitution limit would not cover the cost. Judge Acker also
wrote that any income lost by Miss Calloway was not indicated at the hearing.
128 Id The court wrote that, "in response to the court's question, [the probation officer]
• . . did not consider Mr. Hill a 'victim.'" The third "victim," Mr. Little, suffered property
damage in that the upholstery of his automobile was blood-stained and cut out by the FBI for
evidence.
129 Id at 536. The court also wrote that those persons who paid Hill's funeral expenses
should receive restitution. Id Of course, § 3579(b) (3) authorizes such a payment. See note
100 supra and accompanying text. The court also wrote that it "might struggle to find a way
not to pay Mr. Little for his damaged upholstery." 568 F. Supp. at 536. But, one could
question whether Little was a § 3579 "victim" since none of the defendants were charged or
convicted with damaging Little's car. See Merritt, supra note 91, at 46.
130 568 F. Supp. at 525-26.
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the figures difficult to accept,131 and he also expressed misgivings
about the hearsay testimony concerning defendants' assets and liabil-
ities. 132 The court reported that, at the sentencing hearing, all the
defendants disputed the accuracy of the Victim Impact Statement
and victim Calloway's $599 medical bill. 133 The defendants also of-
fered different views on how any restitution award might be appor-
tioned among them.134
Judge Acker proceeded to pose "questions" concerning sections
3579 and 3580.135 In the court's words, these were only some of the
many questions which "flood to the mind" and are too.numerous to
ask much less answer. Judge Acker posed forty-one of those ques-
tions to help answer the ultimate question, namely, whether or not
the restitution provisions were constitutional. 136 Turning to the mer-
its of the case, the court considered the Act's restitution provisions in
light of the fifth, sixth, seventh, eighth, and fourteenth amendments
to the Constitution, 37 and concluded that sections 3579 and 3580
failed to comply with the seventh, 138 fifth, and fourteenth amend-
131 Id at 526. The judge specifically mentioned the apparent contradiction evidenced by
defendant Satterfield's statement concerning his statutory right-to-redeem certain property
worth S12,000, coupled with the pre-sentence report indication that Satterfield possessed no
assets. Also, expressing an apparent concern regarding the innocent parties associated with
defendants, Judge Acker said the pre-sentence reports failed to indicate whether or not de-
fendants' property was jointly owned.
132 Id
133 Id
134 Id at 526-27 (Should the restitution-paying offenders pay according to their respective
degrees of guilt or by their respective ability to pay?).
135 Id at 527-30.
136 Id The forty-one questions posed concerned: (1) due process; (2) equal protection; (3)
choice of law; (4) appeals problems; (5) other questions of statutory interpretation.
Before turning to the constitutionality of the statutes, Judge Acker examined the legisla-
tive history of the Act concluding that it was not only sparse but difficult to reconstruct.
Judge Acker added that the Act appeared to be a hasty response to a national concern (the
Act was first introduced during "Crime Victims Week") for witnesses and victims. Judge
Acker found no legislative debate over the restitution provisions. He asserted that "[t]he good
lawyers in both houses apparently did not do what the court is being forced to do." M at 530.
Judge Acker concluded that during the congressional deliberations on the Act "constitutional
considerations took a back seat.-' Id at 532.
137 Id at 532-35.
138 Id at 534.
The We/den court considered the seventh amendment right to a jury "[i]n suits at com-
mon law, where the value in controversy shall exceed twenty dollars." U.S. CONST. amend.
VII. Noting that § 3579(h) turns the restitution order into a civil judgment, Judge Acker
concluded that the restitution hearing must be a suit at common law. 568 F. Supp. at 534.
Since the value in controversy in Weden exceeded the twenty-dollar limit, the court held the
right to a jury trial applicable. The court then asserted that since §§ 3579-3580 clearly and
flatly deny a jury trial, they fail the seventh amendment test. Id
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ments, 139 while they passed muster under the sixth 140 and eighth
amendments.141
139 Id at 535. The We/den court then considered the restitution provisions in light of the
"brother and sister" due process and equal protection provisions of the fifth and fourteenth
amendments, again finding the Act unconstitutional. Id at 534-35. The government unsuc-
cessfully argued that, since the broad sentencing power granted by the Probation Act had
been declared constitutional in terms of the fifth amendment, then it followed that the resti-
tution provisions in the VWPA would also pass the test. But, Judge Acker felt Congress
granted too much discretion to the courts and the Justice Department, creating a "potential
Frankenstein" which did not provide due process. Id at 534. The court distinguished be-
tween restitution as a condition to probation under the Probation Act and restitution under
§ 3579. See note 195 infra for Harland's discussion of this distinction. The court called the
§ 3579 restitution order "a civil judgment against a person on the hearsay testimony of a
witness without any discovery and without cross-examination." Id at 535.
Stating that due process required fairness and reasonableness, Judge Acker declared that
the Act set no ascertainable standards. Courts were unleashed without being provided rules of
evidence, rules of discovery, burdens of proof, requirements of notice, requirements of stand-
ing, and the like. As an example, the court referred to the government's brief and the asser-
tion that the rules of evidence did not apply at the sentencing hearing. Judge Acker agreed
with this interpretation, deploring the result that the issue of restitution amount could be
decided upon hearsay evidence. 568 F. Supp. at 534-35. Judge Acker lamented Congress'
failure to contemplate either defendants' due process rights to counsel at the sentencing hear-
ing or the right to review pre-sentence reports, prepare for trial, or present witnesses. Id at
534.
Turning to the question of equal protection Judge Acker concluded that disparate results
under §§ 3579-3580 are so probable that "it is impossible" to look forward to equal protection
compliance. Id at 535. The We/den court looked and did not find the potential for "enough
equality of application" to satisfy the equal protection requirements. But if the restitution
provisions of the Act merely provide a federal court with another sentencing option, different
courts can apply the Act and reach different results, without running afoul of equal protec-
tion. See notes 199-202 infra and accompanying text.
140 The Welden court next turned to the defendants' sixth amendment argument and
pointed out that the sixth amendment provides that persons are entitled to trial by an impar-
tial jury. Id at 534; see also U.S. CONsT. amend. VI ("In all criminal prosecutions the accused
shall enjoy the right to a. . . trial, by an impartial jury."). But the court noted that this sixth
amendment right has never been applied "beyond the adjudication of guilt." 568 F. Supp. at
534. The Welden court held that the sixth amendment did not apply to the issues in dispute.
141 The eighth amendment forbids both excessive fines and cruel and unusual punish-
ment. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII ("Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines
imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted."). Judge Acker reasoned that any
restitution order under §§ 3579-3580 would constitute "fines" under the eighth amendment
but that whether or not they were excessive had to be determined on a case-by-case basis. 568
F. Supp. at 532.
By "indulging the presumption of constitutionality," Judge Acker found, although reluc-
tantly, that "the Act pass[ed] muster" under the eighth amendment because the restitution
order and its enforcement would not amount to cruel and unusual punishment. Id at 533.
The court's concern here centered on the notion that the Act could be construed to allow
imprisonment for debt. The general rule in the United States is that a person may not be
imprisoned for debt. 16 C.J.S. Constitutional Law § 204(1) (1956). While there is no federal
constitutional edict banning it, many state constitutions do ban imprisonment for debt.
Some state statutes, and a federal statute also prohibit imprisonment for debt. Id The perti-
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nent federal statute prohibits any court of the United States from imprisoning any person for
debt if the state in which it sits bans such a penalty. 28 U.S.C. § 2007 (1982).
Section 3579 allows restitution orders "in addition to or in lieu of any other penalty
authorized by law," including imprisonment. 18 U.S.C. § 3579(a)(1) (1982) (emphasis ad-
ded). Further, the Act allows courts to require compliance with a restitution order within
specified periods, id § 3579()(1), and allows authorities to revoke probation or parole if de-
fendants fail to comply. Id 3 5 79 (g). Judge Acker was concerned that court-ordered restitu-
tion, without an accompanying prison term, might later have the effect of putting the
defendant in jail for failure to comply with the order. 568 F. Supp. at 532 ("The Act cer-
tainly encourages and allows trial courts to keep defendants in jail, or to put defendants in
jail, if they fail to pay restitution.").
Despite its doubts, the Welden court found §§ 3579-3580 constitutional under the eighth
amendment. Id at 533. The court referred to the treatment received by the Probation Act in
the courts. Id at 532-33. In responding to a government argument, the court referred to 18
U.S.C. § 3561, enacted in 1925, which allows federal courts to order defendants to make
restitution to "aggrieved parties" as a condition to probation. The Supreme Court has never
considered the constitutionality of § 3651 under the eighth amendment. Id at 532.
The Supreme Court has considered a Georgia statute in a case in which the state acted to
revoke probation when the offender failed to pay a fine and restitution. Id In Bearden v.
Georgia, 103 S. Ct. 2064 (1983), without mentioning the eighth amendment, the court ruled
that a state court could not automatically revoke probation without first determining that the
probationer had not made a bonafide effort to pay restitution.
In Bearden, the defendant pled guilty to charges of burglary and theft but, pursuant to
Georgia law, Georgia First Offender Act, GA. CODE ANN. § 27-2727 to -2730 (current version
at §§ 42-8-60 to -65 (1981)) the court deferred proceedings and sentenced Bearden to four
years probation. As a condition to the probation, the court ordered Bearden to pay a total of
$750 in fines and restitution within four months. Bearden failed to pay and without consider-
ing the reasons for the inability to pay, the Georgia court revoked probation, convicted
Bearden, and ordered imprisonment for the balance of the probation period. 103 S. Ct. at
2067.
The Supreme Court found that the fourteenth amendment "fundamental fairness" doc-
trine prohibited Georgia from depriving Bearden of his "conditional freedom simply because,
through no fault of his own, he cannot pay the fine." Id at 2073. Bearden had borrowed and
paid $200 of the $550 he owed but claimed he could not find a job and was unable to pay the
balance. Id at 2067. The Supreme Court ruled that in keeping with Williams v. Illinois, 399
U.S. 235 (1970), and Tate v. Short, 440 U.S. 397 (1971), the Georgia court should have
considered whether Bearden made a bonafide effort to pay. Further, the court held that alter-
natives to imprisonment must be considered before imposing a prison sentence. Id at 2073-
74.
Judge Acker in Weden, 568 F. Supp. at 533, conceded that Congress may have ade-
quately "anticipated" Bearden in that the Act requires courts and the Parole Commission to
"consider the defendant's employment status, earning ability, financial resources, the willfull-
ness of the defendant's failure to pay, and any other special circumstances," 18 U.S.C.
§ 3579(g), when considering parole or probation revocation. While insisting that nowhere
does the Act specify that the court must consider a parolee's or probationer's "bona./ide efort,"
as required by the fourteenth amendment under Bearden, Judge Acker conceded that perhaps
"this concept is implicit in the statutory language" requiring the court to consider the defend-
ant's financial situation and the willfulness of his failure to pay. 568 F. Supp. at 533. If the
terms of § 3579(g) do not require a consideration of "bona fide effort" it would seem that any
court, considering probation revocation for non-payment of restitution under § 3579, could so
interpret the Act in light of Bearden and the fourteenth amendment.
The court reluctantly concluded that the Act's restitution provisions could "possibl[y]"
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IV. Welden: A Critical Analysis
The Weden court, citing little authority, 42 held that the restitu-
tion provisions of the VWPA were constitutionally infirm, ruling that
those provisions were void as of July 20, 1983.143 The Weden court's
sweeping declaration and its bases are, however, suspect; the govern-
ment has appealed the decision.
The Weden court found that the convicted offender has a right,
under the seventh amendment, to a jury trial of the issues concerning
any restitution order under sections 3579 and 3580.144 The Weden
court determined, without citing any authority, that the sentencing
hearing, at which the court considers restitution, amounts to a "suit
at common law." The court, focusing on section 3579(h), 145 which
allows enforcement of restitution orders "in the same manner as a
judgment in a civil action," concluded that the Act "turns a restitu-
tion order into a civijuidgment." Therefore, according to Weden, the
proceeding which produces the civil judgment/restitution order must
be a "suit at common law." Thus, since the sentence being produced
becomes a civil judgment, the offender has a right to a jury trial. 14
6
Having determined that the offender has a right to a jury trial,
the court asserted that section 3579 clearly and flatly denies that
right. 147 The court was apparently referring to section 3579(d) which
directs that the imposition of the restitution order "will not unduly
complicate or prolong the sentencing process."' 148 Presumably, the
be construed as allowed under the eighth amendment "by indulging the presumption of con-
stitutionality." 568 F. Supp. at 533.
142 While the Welden court was the first court to consider the constitutionality of the Act,
as Judge Acker notes, courts have considered the Probation Act of 1925 and its restitution
provisions. 568 F. Supp. at 534. Nevertheless, Judge Acker was unable to cite any case where
a court has voided a restitution-authorizing statute, or an analogous one, for the reasons enu-
merated by Judge Acker or, for that matter, for any reason. Id at 534-36.
143 Id at 536.
144 Id at 534. The seventh amendment provides that "[i]n suits at common law, where
the value in controversy shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be pre-
served." U.S. CONST. amend. VII.
145 568 F. Supp. at 534; see 18 U.S.C. 3579(h) (1982) ("An order of restitution may be
enforced by the United States or a victim named in the order to receive the restitution in the
same manner as a judgment in a civil action.").
146 568 F. Supp. at 534 (emphasis added).
147 Id
148 Id Judge Acker, in his opinion, failed to specify how § 3579 "clearly and flatly" de-
nies a jury trial. This denial may be inferred from the text of 18 U.S.C. § 3579(d) (1982)
("The court shall impose an order of restitution to the extent that such an order is as fair as
possible to the victim and the imposition of such an order will not unduly complicate or
prolong the sentencing process.').
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Weden court concluded that a jury trial of the restitution order
would "unduly complicate or prolong the sentencing process."
The Weden court erred in four respects in concluding that the
restitution provisions of the VWPA fails to comply with the seventh
amendment. The Welden court failed to: (1) consider a recognized
method of statutory interpretation; (2) realize that restitution is a
part of the sentencing process and not a civil judgment; (3) recognize
that restitution is an equitable remedy, thus not necessitating a jury
trial; and (4) consider salvaging the Act by severing the section it
found objectionable.
First, then, the Weden court interpreted the Act differently than
the accepted interpretation of 18 U.S.C. 3565, a statute similarly
worded. In its appellate brief, the government pointed to 18 U.S.C.
3565149 which allows collection of "fines and penalties" imposed in
all criminal cases "by execution against the property of the defend-
ant in like manner as judgments in civil cases." The government
asserts that section 3565 does not make every "fine and penalty" im-
posed in all criminal cases civil judgments merely because they can
be enforced in a like manner. It follows that the VWPA's similar
provision, section 3579(h), should be similarly interpreted.150
Second, under the Act restitution merely becomes one of a fed-
eral judge's sentencing options. Thus, the judge has the unilateral
discretion, without a jury, to decide whether to impose restitution.
149 Brief for Appellee at 57, United States v. Welden, No. 83-7444 (11th Cir. Aug. 8,
1983)[hereinafter cited as Appellee's Brief (We/den)]. 18 U.S.C. § 3565 (1982) provides that
"[i]n all criminal cases in which judgment or sentence is rendered, imposing the payment of a
fine or penalty, such . . . fine or penalty . . . may be enforced by execution against the
property of the defendant in like manner as judgments in civil cases."
150 The government cited Hill v. Wampler, 298 U.S. 460, 463 (1936), in which the
Supreme Court in dicta simply restated the provisions of 18 U.S.C. § 569 (the predecessor of
18 U.S.C. § 3565) ("[A] fine imposed by a court of the United States in a criminal prosecution
may be enforced by execution against property in like manner as in civil cases."). Appellee's
Brief (Welden),supra note 149, at 57. Further, the government cited FED. R. Civ. P. 69 which
directs that the "[p]rocess to enforce a judgment for the payment of money shall be a writ of
execution, unless the court directs otherwise." Id Thus, fines and penalties imposed in all
federal criminal cases can be enforced like civil judgments, by employing Rule 69 and other
applicable provisions.
A review of case law governing the use of § 3565 fails to reveal any case in which a
defendant claimed that this enforcement provision turned a sentencing hearing into a "suit at
common law." As the government noted in its brief, Appellee's Brief (Welden), supra note 149,
at 57 n.30, even without the Act's § 3579(h) (providing that restitution orders may be en-
forced as if they were civil judgments), § 3565 arguably would have governed the enforce-
ment of the restitution order under § 3579. That is, a § 3579 order could have been construed
a "penalty" enforceable "by execution against property of the defendant in like manner as
judgments in civil cases." § 3565 has, however, never been employed to enforce restitution
orders issued under the Probation Act.
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The Welden court, however, decided that restitution under the Act is
not a sentence but aciviljudgment.'5 1 Congress probably did not intend
that juries determine the restitution amount, whether or not restitu-
tion should be ordered, or to whom. Rather, Congress intended that
the restitution be a part of an offender's sentence. 52 The Constitution
does not mandate jury sentencing, even in capital cases. 153 It is clear
that if a restitution order under the Act amounts to a sentencing op-
tion, the judge in his discretion can determine the restitution amount
and issue the order without impaneling a jury. A jury need not be
impaneled to determine any sentence. 194
Third, the jury trial right has not traditionally been associated
with equitable remedies such as restitution. As mentioned above,
55
states which have granted their criminal courts the discretion to or-
der restitution have not, in general, required the impaneling of juries
to resolve disputed issues. Most state systems (like the federal system
under the VWPA) leave sentencing to the judge's discretion while
providing certain criteria for him to consider. 156 Additionally, at
least two state statutes (Florida's157 and Mississippi's 58) permit the
enforcement of restitution orders by "any means authorized by law"
for enforcement of a judgment. Neither Florida's statute nor Missis-
sippi's has been successfully challenged on the ground that they vio-
late a person's right to a jury, a right granted by both state's
151 568 F. Supp. at 534.
152 This issue, whether the restitution order amounts to a sentence, or part thereof, or,
when issued under the Act amounts to a civil judgment, appears to be the key issue in Welden.
153 A. CAMPBELL, supra note 35, § 70, at 227 n.28 (1978). Campbell writes that most
jurisdictions require jury sentencing in capital cases. Nevertheless, even in those capital cases,
the constitution does not mandate jury sentencing. Id. Campbell cites and quotes Profitt v.
Florida, 428 U.S. 242, 252 (1976) (" 'j]ury sentencing in a capital case can perform an impor-
tant societal function,.. . but it has never been suggested that jury sentencing is constitution-
ally required.' ").
154 Appellee's Brief (Welden), supra note 149, at 58. Among other cases, the government
cited Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 246-47 (1949) (distinguished between the strict
evidentiary rules associated with the trial process and the wide discretion authorized sentenc-
ing judges who are largely free to garner and consider a wide range of information) and
Morgan v. Wainwright, 676 F.2d 476, 480-81 (1 lth Cir. 1982). Citing cases from the former
Fifth Circuit, as well as the Eighth, Seventh, and Second Circuits, the Morgan court indicated
that a criminal defendant has no constitutional right to a jury-determined sentence. Further,
in practice, juries generally do not participate in sentencing.
155 See notes 43-45 supra and accompanying text; see also Appellee's Brief (Welden), supra
note 149, at 58.
156 Id





As far as the right to a jury trial in the federal system is con-
cerned, the Supreme Court in 1830, in Parsons v. Bedford,160 stated
that the seventh amendment may embrace all suits which are not in
equity and admiralty jurisdiction. As the Court pointed out, the
amendment applies to cases in which legal rights are to be ascer-
tained and determined.' 6 ' A serious question exists whether, under
the Act, a judge ascertains and determines legal rights. Judge Acker
evidently believed that legal rights are established at the sentencing
hearing because the victim can enforce any restitution order as if it
were a civil judgment. He wrote: "It is certainly not a proceeding in
equity:"1
62
In distinguishing between law and equity, one must first ex-
amine the nature of the remedy.163 In his discussion of the jury trial
right, Professor Moore mentioned the early inadequacy of the com-
mon law remedies of account and debt whereupon equity stepped in
to compel the payment of money or restitution.164 According to
Moore, restitution in equity is the disgorgement of ill-gotten gains or
the restoration of the status quo.' 65 In discussing the restitution pro-
visions of the VWPA, Representative Rodino stated that a purpose
of the criminal justice system ought to be making the victim
financially whole. 166 The restitution provisions of the Act are part of
Congress' effort to disgorge offenders of ill-gotten gains and restore,
to the extent possible, the victim's status quo. 16 7 And, as Moore
states, "[w]hen restitution is. . authorized by [a] valid statute there
is no right to a jury."'
68
159 FLA. CONST. art. 1, § 22 ("The right of trial by jury shall be secure to all and remain
inviolate."); MIss. CONST. art. 3, § 31 ("The right of trial by jury shall remain inviolate.").
The federal statute allowing Federal courts to condition probation on the payment of
ordered restitution, 18 U.S.C. § 3651 (1982), does not contain a provision that the restitution
order be treated as a civil judgment. Enforcement of restitution under § 3561 includes court-
revocation or modification of probation or the revocation of the suspension of a prison
sentence.
160 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 432, 445-46 (1830).
161 Id
162 568 F. Supp. at 534.
163 Comment, The Seventh Amendment and Civil Rights Statutes: itoy7 Adrift in a Maelstrom,
68 Nw. U.L. REv. 503, 512 (1973)..
164 5 J. MOORE, MOORE's FEDERAL PRACTICE 38.24[2], at 38-194 (2d ed. 1982).
Thereafter, the common-law courts also developed a form of restitution called "general assump-
sit." Id at 38-195.
165 Id
166 128 CONG. REC. H8201 (daily ed. Sept. 30, 1982).
167 Id
168 5 J. MOORE, supra note 164, at 38-196.
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Moreover, the Supreme Court in Curtis v. Loether' 69 considered
the seventh amendment jury trial right under the Civil Rights Act.
For purpose of analysis, however, Curtis serves to illustrate the dis-
tinction between equitable actions and legal actions in light of the
jury trial right. The Court held that in actions for damages, a legal
action under Title VIII of the Civil Rights Act to redress fair housing
law violations, either party may demand a jury. 170 But, in contrast
to the Title VIII action for damages, in Title VII equitable actions
for backpay, or restitution, a jury trial is not required under the sev-
enth amendment. The Supreme Court in Curtis cited several federal
circuit court cases in which the courts considered the jury trial right
under Title VII in actions for backpay, "an equitable remedy [and] a
form of restitution." 171 In those decisions, the circuit courts held that
for these "form[s] of restitution" a jury trial is not required. Also,
these courts noted that a judge had discretion under Title VII when
determining whether or not to award the restitution. 72 The circuit
courts considered this factor as further support for the proposition
that the seventh amendment did not apply in the "backpay" actions
under Title VII.
Like Title VII actions for backpay, the VWPA gives the court
the discretion to order restitution to crime victims. Unlike Title
VIII, under which, according to the Supreme Court in Curtis, juries
are required, the Act does not give private plaintiffs (or the govern-
ment) the right to redress their grievances in terms of seeking and
setting damages. The VWPA merely gives victims and the United
States the ability to enforce restitution orders as zf they were civil
judgments. 73 The jury trial right does not attend to the equitable
169 415 U.S. 189 (1974).
170 Id. at 197.
171 Id at 196-97. The Curtis court cited, e.g., Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, Inc.,
417 F.2d 1122, 1125 (5th Cir. 1969); Robinson v. Lorillard Corp., 444 F.2d 791, 802 (4th Cir.
1971).
172 415 U.S. at 197.
173 18 U.S.C. § 3579(h) (1982).
The Welden court also referred to what it termed the resjudicata effect of the restitution
order. 568 F. Supp. at 535. Here, the judge referred to § 3580(e) ("A conviction of a defend-
ant for an offense involving the act giving rise to restitution under this section shall estop the
defendant from denying the essential allegations of that offense in any subsequent Federal
civil proceeding or State civil proceeding, to the extent consistent with State law, brought by
the victim.").
As the government's brief noted, Appellee's Brief (We/den),supra note 149, at 56 n.29, the
Weden court seemed to conclude that the sentencing hearing must be a civil proceeding be-
cause the defendant cannot in any subsequent civil proceeding "relitigate the facts of the
underlying conviction." Id But even without § 3580(e), the facts in the underlying criminal
conviction could not be relitigated. Id The restitution order itself may or may not have
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remedy of restitution, or any equitable remedy. Whether one treats
the restitution order, for purposes of enforcement, as zJ it were a civil
judgment, seems immaterial to the jury trial issue. Whether a civil
judgment or a sentence option, the restitution order remains equita-
ble in nature and the jury trial right does not apply.
It would seem, then, that the Wden court erred in holding the
restitution provisions of the Act unconstitutional under the seventh
amendment. The sentencing judge has the unilateral discretion to
decide to impose restitution as one of several sentencing options.
Further, the equitable remedy of restitution has not traditionally
been associated with the right to a jury. While it is true a restitution
order under the Act may be enforced "as if it were a civil judgment,"
it does not follow that it therefore zs a civil judgment. Even if it
were, it remains an equitable remedy to which the jury trial right has
not traditionally been applied. Further, under 18 U.S.C. § 3565 any
fine or penalty imposed in all criminal cases may be collected "in like
manner as judgments in civil cases." The sentencing hearings which
have imposed fines and penalties in all criminal cases since section
3565's enactment have not been deemed civil cases and neither, then,
should a restitution sentencing hearing under section 3579.
Finally, even if section 3579(h) does, in effect, transform the sen-
tencing hearing into a civil proceeding (at which a jury trial right
attends) it would seem that under general judicial principles and in
keeping with the presumption of constitutionality, the Weden court
could have considered ruling that section 3579(h) alone was uncon-
stitutional. The court could then have severed section 3579(h) and let
the balance of the restitution provisions, sections 3579 and 3580,
stand.' 74 Judge Acker believed that section 3579(h) turned the sen-
tencing hearing into a seventh amendment "suit at common law." If
section 3579(h) were extricated, the court probably would not have
found the jury trial right applicable, since the restitution order would
then have been just another part of the sentence, not a civil judg-
ment. As merely a sentencing option, the restitution and the issues
associated with its determination can be decided without a jury.
The Weden court also found that sections 3579 and 3580 vio-
collateral estoppel effect. The Act does not address this issue. Id "[I]t is difficult to see how
the presence of a collateral estoppel provision as to the facts underlying a conviction alters the
nature of the ciminal sanction in any way." Id (emphasis added).
174 568 F. Supp. at 533. "Indulging" this presumption of constitutionality, the Wden
court did find the Act constitutional under the eighth amendment. Id For a discussion of the
duty to avoid constitutional decisions, see J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA &J. YOUNG, CONSTITU-
TIONAL LAw 93-95 (2d ed. 1983).
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lated the due process and equal protection requirements of the fifth
and fourteenth amendments. 175 The court acknowledged a United
States court of appeals decision, United States v. Baker, in which the
Seventh Circuit upheld the constitutionality of the Probation Act
and the broad discretion granted the sentencing judge under that
law's provisions. 176 The Baker court, considering the Probation Act
and the judge's discretion thereunder to order restitution as a proba-
tion condition, concluded that section 3651 of the Probation Act was
not unconstitutionally vague under the fifth amendment.1 77 Never-
theless, the Welden Court concluded that Congress granted a judge
acting under sections 3579 and 3580 of the VWPA "too much discre-
tion" and "created a potential Frankenstein."'1
78
Still, sentencing judges can and do act with discretion. 79 But
what kind and how much discretion is constitutional? In Weden the
court attacked the VWPA for unleashing courts without providing
standards such as "rules of evidence, rules of discovery, burdens of
proof, requirements of notice, requirements of standing and the
like."' 80 As an example, Judge Acker lamented the fact that the res-
175 568 F. Supp. at 535; see also U.S. CONST. amend. V ("No person shall be. . . deprived
of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law."); U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1
("No state shall . . . deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the
laws."). While the fourteenth amendment and its equal protection clause on its face only
applies to the states, the due process clause of the fifth amendment has been construed to
apply the equal protection guarantee to the federal government. J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA &
J. YOUNG, supra note 174, at 422-23.
176 568 F. Supp. at 534.
177 Id
178 Id (emphasis added).
179 See note 139 supra and accompanying text.
180 568 F. Supp. at 534. Judge Acker cited Sexton v. Barry, 233 F.2d 220 (6th Cir. 1956),
cert. denied, 352 U.S. 870 (1956), for the proposition that, to satisfy both the "due process" and
"equal protection" requirements "a statute must not subject an individual to arbitrary or
uneven exercises of power." In Sexton the Sixth Circuit considered an action to enjoin a state
court judge's actions regarding matters in probate. In dicta, the Sixth Circuit wrote that due
process is "secured by laws operating on all alike, and not subjecting the individual to the
arbitrary or uneven exercises of the powers of government unrestrained by the established
principles of private right and distributive justice." Id at 224. Further, the Sexton court wrote
that "equal protection" implies that "all litigants similarly situated may appeal to courts for
both relief and defense under like conditions, with like protection, and without discrimina-
tion." Id These principles certainly are valid ones, but the Welden court failed to cite any
case where a court applied these principles to a sentencing statute analogous to §§ 3579-3580.
Next, Judge Acker stated the familiar due process test of "fairness and reasonableness,"
citing a 1968 decision of the court for the Southern District of West Virginia. Id at 534. In
the case, Barker v. Hardway, 283 F. Supp. 228 (S.D.W. Va. 1968), afd, 399 F.2d 638 (1968),
cert. denied, 394 U.S. 905 (1969), the district court dismissed the complaint of a group of sus-
pended college students. The students claimed the college administration denied them due
process in suspending them after several violent demonstrations. Like the Sexton court, the
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titution sentencing-issue can be decided on hearsay evidence.' 8'
Campbell, in his treatise Law of Sentencing, states that "[d]ue pro-
cess does not require a judge to draw sentencing information through
the narrow net of courtroom evidence rules."' 8 2 He writes that, gen-
erally, judges are allowed "virtually unlimited discretion" as to kind
and source of information when considering sentencing. Judges can
look to presentence reports, police reports, and even observations of
the offender when determining what sentence ought to be im-
posed.'8 3 Judicial discretion at the sentencing stage is indeed very
broad.
Nevertheless, there are some limits to this discretion. As the gov-
ernment indicated in its appellate brief, the We/den court, acting
under the Act, as well as all federal courts ordering criminal
sentences, must follow the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.
18 4
Rule 32(c) (2), as amended by the VWPA, lists the information which
the Probation Service must include in the presentence report, 8 5 un-
less the defendant waives that report. 86 The defendant has a right to
make a statement under Rule 32(a) (1) 187 to the sentencing judge who
must, under Rule 32(c)(3), disclose the pre-sentence report to the
defendant 188
Baker court denied the claim, holding that the defendant college acted properly. Id at 237.
Again, the Welden court failed to cite authority in other than general terms.
181 568 F. Supp. at 534-35.
182 A. CAMPBELL, supra note 35, § 85, at 275.
183 Id at 276. Campbell does note that sentences have been remanded where based on
unsubstantiated hearsay. Id § 88, at 284. No provision of the Act, however, requires the
unquestioned acceptance of such hearsay or the total reliance thereon.
184 Appellee's Brief (Welden), supra note 149, at 59; see a/so Brief for Appellee (Richard),
supra note 125, at 19-21 (Existing law regarding sentencing applies to restitution sentencing
under the Act. In general this existing law provides that: (1) the formal rules of evidence do
not apply to sentencing proceedings; (2) the sentencing judge is granted nearly unlimited
access and use of information regarding the defendant's background; (3) within limits, sen-
tencing judges impose sentences within their own discretion; (4) defendants cannot demand
discovery of government evidence at sentencing hearings; (5) no jury right attends the sen-
tencing process; and, (6) the defendant may not demand an evidentiary hearing at
sentencing.).
185 FED. R. CRIM. P. 32(c)(2); see also notes 73-78 supra and accompanying text.
186 Id at 32(c)(1) ("The probation service. . . shall make a presentence investigation and
report. . . unless. . . the defendant waives a presentence investigation and report.").
187 Id at 32(a) (Before imposing sentence the court must afford the defense attorney, the
defendant, and the government attorney an opportunity to speak on the punishment issue.).
188 Id at 32(c)(3) (Upon request the defendant or his counsel must be permitted to read
the pre-sentence report. However, certain information-diagnostic opinion which might dis-
rupt rehabilitation, information obtained from a confidential source, or information which, if
disclosed, might result in harm to anyone-may be excluded from the report copy granted
the defendant.).
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The Act itself provides a procedures section, section 3580, which
lists the criteria a sentencing court must consider, 89 mandates disclo-
sure to the defendant of all reports which contain information relat-
ing to these criteria,' 9° and provides the court with standards for
resolving the restitution issue. 91 As the government brief in the Wel-
den appeal points out, 9 2 the Act is more specific in delineating sen-
tencing procedures than the 1925 Probation Act, which has been
held constitutional under the fifth amendment.
1 93
The Welden court drew a distinction between ordering restitu-
tion as a condition of probation pursuant to the Probation Act and
basing a civil judgment on hearsay "without any discovery and with-
out cross-examination."'' 94 Again, the infirmity inherent in sections
3579 and 3580 is, according to Welden, section 3579(h), which allows
enforcement of the restitution order "as if it were a civil judg-
ment."'95 As previously discussed, this conclusion, that section
3579(h) turns the restitution order into a civil judgment, is questiona-
ble at best.' 96 Again, even if it were true, the court could have con-
sidered declaring only 3579(h) void, leaving the balance of sections
3579 and 3580 intact.
9 7
In sum, due process standards of trial differ from those standards
applicable at sentencing. 98 Judge Acker seems to apply the same
189 18 U.S.C. 3580(a); see note 110 supra and accompanying text.
190 18 U.S.C. 3580(c); see note 112 supra and accompanying text.
191 18 U.S.C. 3580(d); see note 113 supra and accompanying text.
192 Appellee's Brief (Weden), supra note 149, at 61 (Sections 3579-3580 provide restitution
sentencing procedures and limits. For example, § 3579(b)(1) mandates return or replace-
ment of lost property, or payment of its value. Section 3579(b)(2) lists the costs, relating to
bodily injury, which are subject to restitution. Section 3579(b)(3) indicates that courts may
require offenders pay funeral costs. In § 3580(a)(1) Congress listed factors to be considered
when assessing the restitution amount-victim loss, defendant's financial resources, defend-
ant's needs. "In other words, the statute leaves little room for discretion.").
193 United States v. Baker, 429 F.2d 1344 (7th Cir. 1970),cited in Welden, 568 F. Supp. at
534.
194 568 F. Supp. at 535.
195 Id Harland, in his article, supra note 21, at 72, wrote of the importance of the distinc-
tion between restitution as a condition of probation and restitution as a sentence. First, the
law treats differently those in default; offenders who receive restitution as a probation-condi-
tion may receive a prison sentence while those who receive restitution sentences may be held
in contempt of court. Second, according to Harland, courts have held restitution sentences
void without statutory authority while probation-condition restitution has been upheld even
without such authority.
196 See notes 149-54 supra and accompanying text.
197 See note 174 supra and accompanying text.
198 A. CAMPBELL, supra note 35, § 41, at 150-51 (quoting Solesbee v. Balkcom, 339 U.S. 9
(1950) (" 'necessary and inherent' differences between due process standards at trial and at
sentencing'), reh'g denied, 339 U.S. 926 (1950); see also Harland, supra note 21, at 99 (Given the
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standards because of his premise that the sentencing hearing
amounts to a proceeding which produces a civil judgment. When
the erroneous premise falls, the restitution order becomes just an-
other sentencing option. As such, the great body of law applied to
sentencing proceedings serves to adequately guide the courts under
the Constitution.
Addressing the "equal protection" issue, Judge Acker expressed
a concern that it is impossible to look forward to enough equality of
application for the Act to comply with equal protection. 9 9 The
court fails to cite one case in support of this notion. Campbell writes
that courts have uniformly held that courts do not violate equal pro-
tection principles by imposing different sanctions on offenders con-
victed of the same offences. 200 The general rule is: courts need act
only within statutory parameters. 20' Again, the Act provides those
parameters in section 3580 in more detail than the other federal resti-
tution provision embodied in the Probation Act.
20 2
V. Conclusion
In passing the VWPA Congress believed in the time-honored,
thoroughly logical notion that offenders should pay their victims, in-
demnifying them for their losses. In Weden the court concluded that
Congress failed in its effort to draft a constitutional statute. The
court reasoned that since under the enforcement provision of the
VWPA a restitution order could be enforced as a civil judgment it
was-a civil judgment. And, therefore, the proceeding which pro-
duced the restitution order (otherwise known as the sentencing hear-
ing) must be a "suit at common law." The court concluded that the
substantive and procedural rights guaranteed in a federal civil suit-
procedure, discovery, cross-examination, etc.-were due any offender
who, at "sentencing," may be ordered to pay restitution under the
Act. Since the Act forbids any restitution determination which
might unduly complicate or prolong sentencing, the Weden court de-
same facts, a restitution-sentencing proceeding need not comply with the same due process
standards required of a civil proceeding. A "summary procedural pattern" suffices in the
criminal sentencing setting while the civil proceeding must include a "plenary trial" with
"formal evidence.").
199 568 F. Supp. at 535.
200 A. CAMPBELL, supra note 35, § 45, at 163-64.
201 Id at 164.
202 See notes 109-13 supra and accompanying text; see also Appellee's Brief (Weden) supra
note 149, at 63 (The Probation Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3561, lends itself to "less evenhanded" appli-
cation since it, in contrast to § 3580, fails to specify the factors a court need consider or how
much restitution a court should order given bodily injury or property damage.).
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termined that the Act, in effect, unconsitutionally forbids these sub-
stantive and procedural rights.
The restitution provisions, however, should survive. Pre-Act
federal law allowed enforcement of penalties "in like manner as judg-
ments in civil cases." Neither restitution orders under the 1925 Pro-
bation Act, nor other penalties issued under federal criminal law
have ever been treated as the Weden court treated sections 3579 and
3580. A sentence does not become a civil judgment merely because a
statute provides that, for enforcement purposes, a sentence may be
treated as f it were a civil judgment. Thus, the Constitution does not
require the procedural and substantive safeguards the Welden court
held essential to the restitution hearing. Further, even if the restitu-
tion order becomes a civil judgment, the order's equitable nature
precludes the applicability of a seventh amendment right to jury
trial.
The restitution order serves as a sentencing option. Acting
within the parameters of the VWPA, the sentencing judge applies
the established body of law governing sentencing. As such, restitu-
tion does and should properly become part of any sentence the judge
in his discretion can order.
Congress enacted the VWPA in an effort to at least begin ad-
dressing the needs of victims and witnesses who become entangled in
the federal criminal justice system. The restitution provisions, a part
of the admittedly imperfect effort to compensate victims for their
losses, must be given a fair chance to effect this noble end. Crime
victims deserve at least this much.
Thomas M. Kelly
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